

12-20-68 Sunday

+ status of info

appears

- 2) There are situations in which it ~~is~~ ^{appears} reasonable for one country (B) to build up ^{Type I} a deterrent capability, to ensure its security i.e. its ability to retal. to a first strike by A

- (6) This may seem, ^{be} [actually, not just "appears": give "full" info], under the circumstances, the best approach available
(comprehension of ...?)

~~(3)~~ (3) ~~US~~ B = US vs. Hungary (A), 1939-1944 ^{with-}
US vs. SU 1

~~(4)~~ ^{B =} SU, vs. US, 1945-52

SU vs. US, 1961-62 (C-II - but!)

SU vs. US 1964-1968 ; —?

(6) China vs. US ¹⁹⁵⁰ 1949-54-58-
[SO unilateral]

Reasonable to build up FS cap.

^{give "intel"}
to RU vs.
Type II: ally; or
major
country (b)

Reasonable to build up preemptive cap.

actually? Never

Study, Dec. 20, 08

(Effort to build up may involve risk
of a premature attack:

SU, 1962 (C-II)

SU, 1953- (Mr. Dallas)

Notes: other NWS

(unless US 1983?)

1955- (Killing)

K. Henry on missile gap, bluffs:
1961 K, 1959-62

~~Not~~ ^{1986?}
K. Henry, (1967?)
(Dinner)

China 1961, 1964, 1969 (SU)

Jan 2004-06-08-

Risk ~~that~~ of loss of control

esp. C-II NWS (SU)
But in 1961

Even also at risk
+ world (not US)

(Hidden?)

1983: SU fear of Reagan FS

(despite, "Wally," strong det on both
sides)

Constructive instability:
both sides

"stability" - expert for bluffs (US)
+ fall from (US)
+ FS posture

(This could arise for Soviet-Pak ($\approx$ US-SU)

and again for US-Russia (Reagan: "run
again" NO

and conceivably, US-China

"The Plague"

(fear? - China

Argentina-Brazil? Is - from?

The Road to Hell (is paved not only with good intention
"Nuclear Plague"

(good, from - but, S-R framing
+ den. full advantage, bluff, Henry
IGNORANCE (and stuff)

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1st page. cont.

2.

? (6) Israel vs. Arab States

(better: accompanied by 2-state sol.

(Vancouver points)

(as "real" for Holon

Heights of West Bank)

[^{would be:} from us. US - except for "Transition
danger"

North Korea vs. US - " " "

which it got through

(2) all above;

(big danger, 1994?

thanks to US-Ing won

^{SH}
Ing vs. US 1991, give aggressive intentions
wrt Kuwait

only case:
of preventive
(in part) attack:
forced by aggression

but: prevented to transition
risk during Gulf War, after
preventive aggression

Lesson: don't challenge US unless ... "

(But China did, in 1950 with SU umbrella

~~and~~ ^{and} at DBP, 1954

" " "

12-20-08

Mr Boor

p. 3

We (US) have made it reasonable/compelling
for other countries to require or improve
a more det (I) cap — less, optimal

SU

India: (NAR/N 1971 tilt to India)

China

Why Iraq/SU program

before Gulf War?

^{from}
~~Indian~~ offensives —

from — Iraq War?

Iraq (after 1991 — they close out to,
but secrecy/bluff led to
premature attack

K misled this, by secrecy & bluff,
in 1957-62

SU transition efforts in 1962

— Iraqat would closest to
New Hell

apparently "misled"

after Berlin '61 (Kilpatrick)

Pushy:

for stop reasons;

again, on more, after C-II

(wrong lesson:

CTB for more in SU

intimidation (Bogdanov)

build-up; but over

CTB still available,

under CBI?

Kilpatrick Committee: yes

12-20-8

4.

Arab hostility to Israel, 1948-1967 -
+ Israel axis for Greater Israel
gave Israel a great incentive for nuclear

~~Israel~~

US-Pak program (Blunt):

vs. India - on Kashmir?

- India threat 1974?

Anyway, Pak needs "Syke II" vs
Indian grand threat

like Israel

"US needs for
Syke II / PS

like US/NATO facing SU grand threat
to Berlin ~~China~~

West Germany

"Gergentarian?"

Norway?!

Iran / ME (oil)

and "threats" of SU embellish (Syke II or III)
over China, North Korea, ~~Arabia~~, Cuba!

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5,

POINT: 1) US has never been in group (b):

It has never been the case that real
circumstances — realistically understood/
negotiated — made buildup of Type I det
cap. either compelling or "the best/option"
policy

Report for 1939-44, vs. Germany
(2) and this was always realized by some
authorities/experts/officers inside as well as
outside USG — i.e., the case that (3) official
was seen by them as false

(e.g. - Army/Navy intell 1958-61

- all in USG 1962-

Kenyon, 1949 (vs. Ridge

esp. vs. Type II)

McN vs. Type II, 1961-

JFK, (McN asst.)

Seeing/bluff/threats several badly
for Germany 1939-44

SU 1954 (border gap)

1958-61 minor gap

1956-80?

1962 C-II effort (F.M.A)

Drug/SH 1990

1991-2002 (and at Arm?)

Min det: would well for China (NK)

Seeing/bluff/Warred out badly for North Korea: got thru through
transition

dangerous for Arm now — will they get through? Maybe

C.

Always, for US, a better alternative

(and for SU, after about 1964-65

(as and for Paris),
1966-68

or in MIRVs?

or for ABM

or SS-18 SS-20 (error)

(China has not yet made comparable
errors)

Disarmament/Offensive Plan

(Would Banned Plan have been better for SU,
than det — allowing US monopoly? ^{or would?}

no first-test of H (1949-52)

no first-test of ICBM

(as: Argentina & N-bomb
makes feasible)

or IRBM

(Elim SU grand/stone threat to [Berlin?]
West Europe (SU det to US Stage II)

Coop Security:

or West Army

Kipp; Remon
ref? 1949!

SU let go of
Europe, East Europe

←

Remember, NWOT; REMOVE THREAT
K: GCD (at least, in Europe!)

Not proposed,
exposed!

Abolitionists: Who want to argue
against necessity (harm, legitimacy)
of US Type I (or Type II) det

that to argue that it "makes no sense,"
or "is not needed" or "creates more
danger than security"
for anybody and everybody, at
all times.

But this ignores that (thinks to, give, US
FCU/FS threats, and allegedly (to US public) Type I
Det posture)

1) Type I det does look reasonable,
unprovoked, even compelling, harm legitimate, on
basis of realistic appreciation of situation
to ^{some} OTHER COUNTRIES SU

China
(USSR, NK + Iran
now, Pak / India)

2) Type II has at least as
~~strong~~ as "legit. interests" to ^{some} other countries
as for NATO facing SU "threat"

(though later ignores: 2) NK winter

violence 6) threat to neutrals

c) suicide / genocide

namely: Israel
Pakistan

US condemnation of Israel are esp. useful be hypocritical, double
if it existed, or, so far as there is any
criticism of Israel — " " — is another matter.

- (3) Intention (2) does arise — feel in part of
 heavy + bluff by others (even if this
 does not feel everyone in USG, or as many
 as claim / pretend to be fooled)
 (see Iraq + WMDs
 SU gaps)

Thus, ~~type~~ in hypothetical situation —
 which are claimed to "obtain", things
 so far, always wrong / false —

lies, based on
 interests

data (on Iraq II) can/does appear
 necessary, more reasonable, right, ~~always~~
 lawful

see World Court, ICJ

Counter to this is:

- 1) It has always been wrong.
- 2) It has always involved US + world digns,
 not right necessary + established
- 3) Mistake have usually (not, 1939-44) been
 based partly or mainly on special interests,
 + involved lies,
- 4) Yes, acting on such claims should be
 inhibited by 1) chapter 2) search for motives
misinformation
- 3) movement of danger 4) search for alternatives

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9.

- 1) Above 1-4 have usually (always?) been missing. 2) Poss. of coop. investigation (though suspended by, of course, USSR & North Korea, (China) all usually suspicious)
vs. "open skies" (instead of GCD - for sake) poss. of assurance
massive inspection

has usually been under-estimated

(Explicitly interest in uncertainty / ignorance / per-
dition / one-way
Cttr see SU fear of spies, with
inspiration by CTB, 1963
Saddam Hussein, 1994-98-2002

3) alt. of real and control (toward stability
+ dominant

+ NFU

registered of US (Helfman Committee 1965
NPT 1968 -

But: ABM Treaty

MIRV 1968 -

(SALT/START?)

Calvin; Initiatives (Paris)

no CD

IMT

NFU after 1989... (Huang)

Handbook: unilateral withdrawal

1991: Bush/Herrero memo

CTB / moratorium

South Africa, abol.

Registration of prod. by, Huang, Hansen, Argentina, Brazil...

(4) CANDOR registered of all (Dir. Gov. correct?)

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US-SU

10.

Yank: US has driven and will

(not permitted / permitted /
prolif)

not only in sum it has initiated
quantitative & qualitative build-up

(not, Yank)
but of its new threats

(though SU continued by
"threat" to Berlin & Europe)

larger largely motivated by

1) expanding Sov empire
into, expanding

and 2) deterring West expansion
or new attack

and - one could say (as C. Warren
did say)

of "threat" to: ME (?)

SU-China to SEA... "dominos"

"world" down

"we will bury you" (address)

WNL's

LA

old Good

Cuba

+ its secret + bluffs

and internal brutality

(= Hitler)

AND ...

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4

by/because of its misuse (clonish, or real,
but mistaken)

leaves that det (I, or II)
was necessary:

always wrong for US.

// joint as fire-bombing of cities was
(and FC vs. Japan)
was not necessary (how, legit)
in WWII

for the strongest country in the world

(+ which, from 1945-49, had a
monopoly of nukes;
and after 1950, always had
unequal superiority in nukes
or at least, since 1975, solid
parity.

We have made nukes (at least — and at
most! — misdet, or
det-only)

legit for some oth countries

(if US standards of evaluation)

not we.
"optimal":

and (at det-only levels) for ourselves, since

starting at 1949, + esp. since 1964/68 — (negligible SU FS esp.

actual levels:

with optimal or legit

US FS exp. has never (?) been
messy, "hazy", legit,

(though (?) it might reasonably have
 appeared so in 1950 - "Korea as test"
 in fall)

though Kerner (Kittens) proposed an
 alternative then, in Europe

- in reality -
 and US has never required the build-up
 beyond min det (Yank test) that it
undertakes. 1952-

1953-60

1961-68

1969-

nor did it require A-bomb in WW-II,
 1939-45

though it reasonably found it
right

This should have been accompanied from
1939 on by planning + policy for
 eliminating or controlling threat of one over

1) after WWI

2) in WWI, if it turned out (as it
 did, 1943-44) that it was not necessary.

when min
 did!

(Frank / Eisenhower investigation & efforts should
 have begun much earlier than May 8, 1945;
 no later than mid-1944, if not 43)

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Dept of Peace? Fair, in principle; but
we live in a country where ACDA was
successfully opposed, subverted, then
dismantled (Rogers/Bush: Adelman
file)
(and Clinton?!)
+ one Peace Institute

We (civilization) can't afford ~~the~~
the first (next) instance of FU

We can't run the first instance
of large-scale nuclear war (FS, SIOPs)

So that of applying a law after
actual large-scale attack

— investigating, investigating, trying,
convicting, punishing —
is totally unrealistic.

Even after a FU (unless a terrorist.

Who else would who could be caught?
be sanctioned? Israel? not, suicides!
Pol, India? (NK, probably!) (then, yes!)
US? Russia? China? (Taiwan)

So — we can't wait for a mushroom cloud
to — do what?

Prompter attack?

It was rejected for SU

+ 2nd China (1961, 64,
(though, provocation
banned in 1965-78)

NK

used us. May in 1991 (+ contemplated from 1992-
+ 2003 2002

a danger for Iran (2006-08, still?)

but who else?

not any NWS

(unless, Pak?)

"terrorists"

(if we know where, who
Cpt we don't that don't profit,
traffic is NEU + PU
are power profit (NPT!)

Hype We must take plans, ^{for} threats of
FC seriously — if US in particular!
and act now to eliminate them,

most are not known — expose them
to US public, elites condemn them

approval of —
US elites

(some public:
 $\frac{1}{3} - \frac{2}{3}$?)

(treat them as criminal? UN Res

X Improbable for US — like power of
act for others, giving US winning, power!)
as did old Iran)

Reject, abandon them
(They & 4 do not propose this —

12-20-8

Pres. 12

Were nukes ever really necessary?

[Or - was it always true, for everyone,
that "It is a sin to possess a nuclear
weapon"? Father _____

For US not strong, in view of reasonable belief?

Rothblat: No: wouldn't deter H.

wouldn't win war for H
(1 or 2; but...?)

could win over Hitler
without

(as we did!)

(clear from when?

mid-42? 43?

Samuel: Would it (not) exist without nukes?

(Conventional exp.

Lesson of the Holocaust is '72)

SC? (Stalin "banned" to that as - give US attitude
understandably

Yitz - if US had wanted to prevent
it by agreement... was that
impossible?

Could Wallerstein have avoided it?

If as used in WWII?

accountability / law p.(v)
12-20-68

News. p. 17

One proposition: News were we. for a given
its ^{other} crimes & policies not those of others

- Does international criminal law exist for
apply to

levels ^{of officials} of permanent members of UN SC?

(see veto

+ strength

(and eventually
more weapons!)

- If not: is its "real law" for others -
though not universal?

- How can it be? It does apply to
soldiers, war crimes.

(in practice: to their superiors?
causes of this?

Not My Lai or Shan Phung ^{of 8 hours} Express

Not does US public believe it should (have):

Can to Calley (of Madison, Henderson)

or can to Hunter officers (Kilman)

- but not war crimes against peace
crimes vs. humanity

Pen-5 can't be tried in ICC (can't from
jurisdictional question.

of ICJ

US

Vs. Peter Weiss (co. me, on min det, NFO, with:

"Since RAND, you've become
halfway - moral"

- Could there be hypothetical circumstances
in which reasonable / sane, decent / moral
people believe it necessary to have a
min det

without contradicting this rationality &
morality / decency

believe it to be moral & decent,
and may not to have it?

Yes - such crises have existed

a) 1939-44, for US

b) 1949-52, for SU

1950's, for China

Soviet?

Pak?

(Diff necessity arise only in context of
aggressive, illegitimate policies?

for US start with, no

for SU (central of East Eur)?

Sov. system in SU? "

rev. support? - no

for China: no

Crisis were climatic (mainly drafting - some

through & some) not innocently

believed & many (i.e. many officials)
in 1950's vs. SU

Beliefs in this after exposure of missile gap
 → 1981 were very self-serving, interested,
 little exposure of what is evidence...

(they are SU been in 1983: (they rejected
 by SU efforts in DC and Moscow)

Should such fears (never) used consistently
 to actual reality for US
 (or for SU in 1983)

to have always been over-reaction of b-t
 concern about arms race, impact of our
 own build-up on this?

e.g. what use in Hiroshima & Nag?

(yes — England, France, 100+
 scientists were right
 about this)

But no one (?) in DC was aware of
 this view,
 or was taking such a consideration
into account at the time

("More attacks on dogmas for us in b-t,
 preclude further our control,
 assume SU build-up + policy")

as well as: possibly being unnecessary
 if there were effort to forewarn
 as in military times (Khrushchev) or kill too many (this
 (boston 3d)

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23

Did SU have to watch US bomb?

(However, it was virtually inevitable for a ruler of SU — not only Stalin — as it was for UK and France, given that they could.)

Still, Stalin had an adequate deterrent to ^{US} invasion — non-nuclear and even to limited nuclear attacks

entering { But could he have relied on US rejection of Khrushchev's desire for preventive war, with no nuclear det? (No)

or, China?

He'd chosen not to rely only on non-nuclear arms / weapons and US support and det

(vs. SU-supported Arabs)

Was that wrong, right?

(despite opposition by most of Colin to pursuing it)

(Given the det it, and had not suffered with US rejection of preventive, or even Arab arms here —

it was rational to keep it.

But — to block offense (preemptive?!) US effort to stop proliferation — was that rational?

But US arm otherwise was inclined to stop race or proliferation — so it didn't block this

now under
BHO?

12-20-08

and a foreign policy 24
isolation & war policy
a war policy - for

applies to
NEWS!

A case for flexible pursuing
or having war and war plans + forces -
has never been legit (moral)
unless it appears necessary
(to avert a greater evil)

(not not productive of a greater evil!)

and 2) when that judgment of "necessity," and
all its elements (1) (scientific, administrative)

and repe
continues,
renewed
reality - testing,
exp. or conditions
materially change;
and machines
to adapt radically,
change course

has stood up to a thorough test -
to fulfill extent possible, giving the holistic an
of the realism of constant change
and thorough (diagnostic, administrative)
exploration of alternatives and their consequences + costs
including alternatives that involve serious
personal, social, political RISKS of
sacrifice/loss + COSTS, to a

and (i.e.) adequate appreciation of the
own costs of the to other nations (enemies,
allies, neutrals, as well as US - and to further,
civilization, humanity, other life!) if the goal
war policy leads to, or fails to prevent, war ever!
(i.e. foreign policy, diplomacy, arm control)

at new policy
US foreign policy since 1945 (9 am, 1942!)
has never — reverted — met these conditions
for legitimacy
nor have judgments of "necessity"
considered reverted to validity

(i.e. absence — continuously — of serious
efforts at validity — truly and exploration
of alternatives

(countries we tried ^{hard} and failed to get
good evidence — 1955?

but when we got increasingly
good (negative) evidence ¹⁹⁵⁶⁻¹⁹⁶¹ (e.g. Barfield)
it was ignored! even after proof ^{apriori} _{left to 61}
(as for proof WMDs!) — 2002
(an end of CW!) 1989

for US
mistaken (as if
not imminent)
in 1939-44
and throughout
1950's NEW
(SU no more
built up a
threat to US in 50's
than ^{in 60's} Soviet
in '90's)

It has always been 'illegitimate, immoral' since 1944-45
(and degrades for l-r: not, in earlier phase, in s-r)
even in times of existing beliefs
still more in view of "best beliefs" / validity

Not true for all possessions of arms, other NWS
(true ^{for} UK + France?) (France) = prerogative
influence

There was a threat to US — of instability — from
1965 on — but always a much better alternative
(and control, driven) rather than a necessity for kill.
(even now the mission of kill was a "necessity"?)

A policy (an area policy)
or an invasion and occupation (the thing)

which makes things predictably worse or better
how and in future
- increases or safety
Afghanistan? which makes things predictably worse or better
simply (?) unpromising
(and domestic, esp. of
civilians)
(not costs in
US lives)
esp if not abstracts / prevents a policy that
it does would increase or safety

(at least: portions
widespread of an
oppressive regime:
see VN, though
DRV and Saigon
claim to be fighting
the Taliban;
Chiang Kai-shek, 1949
Castro (not using
US air ~ 1961)
not invading Iraq, 1991 (Bush I)
not good enough reasons
to kill people (and civs)
or lose US lives: despite
some claim for doing so (+ claim of "conventions" + "human" interventions
text it would be immoral not to do so)
Serbia, 1998
Iraq now, and a stronger case that occupation prevents
better policy vs. threat vs. US (even if
it does save some Iraqi lives: while
killing many others). (see an analysis, 1971
made in Korea, ending

in Committee, already!
Bosnian Wars in VN, 1965-69
US occupation

and the wishes
of locals!

(see an analysis, 1971
made in Korea, ending

Cries could exist when ~~the~~ most
 the Americans would agree that cries
 should be used to attack

most Americans believe those cries
did exist in Aug - 1945.

They are mistaken - in detail, & overall.

Yet even I could agree that cries
 could exist when the cause justified
 (and ~~the~~ may more cries, possession).

but this has never occurred,
 except frequent claims of some that
 they did exist were always mistaken

Evaluate in light of this history claims
 that one attack or from is, or could
 be, justified now

or in near future
 and that "option" must be
 threatened.

(a threat - supposedly & formally -
 to do something legit -
 Failure to challenge such a threat helps
make its appearance legit to carry out.
 (Chung, Waller)

12-20-08

Det (I) has always been presented
to the public as the main or even sole
aim of an nuclear posture.

A legal aim
which requires an actual posture.

That has never been true.

Changes:

China

SU, 1945-68

- Det (I) has never been the principal aim
of an actual war program & posture.

Under actual crisis, including severe beliefs
- Det has never required an actual program,
manipulated or
justified, unjustified the of military efforts
Nor has anything else or, "concerns"
as other aims, even when most
(at great risk)

Dec. 27, 00 (on "Christmas")

Things are never - quite - hopeless

I'd've not that certain (as if they appear to be).

Still, the impression that a particular approach
of configuration of events or processes (or a particular
Savage - way to see - is extremely improving
(tho. as "seen to fail")
is extra after realistic.

Christy Puller.

Anders

But - The Perfect Storm - "She's not going to let us out."

Humans/wave/under/arenals (since 1959 ^{since "gap"})

(There was ^{are} a "gap" from 1945-65

always wants in our favor

Since then, D-L, ES, CF have all been delusions,
feeling a certain "loss (wrongless)" "loss",
(Warner: "After on a Transmill")

both suspended on ~~an~~ abys
not racing away from the edge
(or toward it)

swing only to maintain
profits + status of US/SU MICs.

June: no "use" of waves ~~now~~ that time, OR BEFORE
with word for "attack"

12-27-08

2

US faced non-mue deterrent

SU Warsaw Pact

Chinese "hordes"

and SU was deterred in ME

(as were we, ...)

[Change of ending CW/arc and rose (Hunt/Thiff)
misred in 61-62 (VFR death?)
red (Hunt/Thiff - Ringman?)
red 1990

8-5-7

Sansen Option of US

(i.e. France, Israel, South Africa, South Korea)

NC as from CW:

US use threats v. Iran press, ^{successfully} an ally to bring pressure on Iran (without much success).

Reason for doing ^(or) use weapons #47

(Found Sansen option: reason #45 - to deter SU)

#46 to get US to attack SU, if...

#48 to get US to make concessions to SU (as Berlin) in crisis, rather than provoke US SU attack...

NC #50 for US - to get Iran to be representative, stop opposition

NC #51 to encourage Iran to develop a new interest, requiring premature attack of US

#44 for Israel: get US to attack Iran

7
Hankla Park #43 for US/Iran: get Iran to get Libya to reduce attacks (on...? US? or Benin?)

Mr. Taylor (like an of RT in spring of '65: get DRV to turn off NLF (not, to stop "opposition") so much

WRC puts new FC option on the table for

NC as from CW:

US use threats v. Iran press, ^{successfully} an ally
to bring pressure on Iran (without much
success).

Reason for doing ^(over) new weapons #47

(Fund Sauran option: reason #45 - to
deter SU)

#46 to get US to attack SU, if...

#48 to get US to make concessions to
SU (on Berlin) in crisis, rather than provoke
SU attack...

NC #50 for US - to get Iran to be repressive, stop
opposition

NC #51 to encourage Iran to develop a new interest,
requiring premature attack of US

7

#44 for Sauran: get US to attack Iran

North Korea #43 for US/Iran: get Iran to get China to
reduce attacks (on...? US? on Berlin?)

Mex. Taylor (bill an of RT in spring of '65: get DRV
to turn off NLF (but, to stop "supremacy")
so much

WRC puts new FC option on the table for
Afghanistan & Pak - for joint trial (as Obama
observed
abroad)

On India-US deal:

see 1964, my awareness

Rusk, McN McG

Holbrooke

- US policy: mixed friends, mixed enemies

(Israel; Pak; India;
(South Africa?)

Rusk - ^{negotiating} policy

N/HAK: Noharone

Not non-prolif

Holbrooke: - Can't discriminate among NNWS

- Can't say, "Don't do what we do."

(Can't lead in other direction

while ... declaring our right to

thunder FC

+ making FC threats

+ building new warheads

/"We have a special moral
responsibility: to deter a
nuclear ~~SD~~ R on China

But other countries have pressing "needs" -

they will not give up nukes while we act

on our perceived need

forget that

first are guards,

nukes are useless,

a total waste

No one tells US, or NNWS,

or NNWS, nukes have

no use; not threats

(note: dangerous, not

to be used

Aug 1964
Rout, McN
McG

US policy: mutual basis, mutual security
Rout - having
N/NAK: Nakano
Rout - having
N/NAK: Nakano
Rout - having
N/NAK: Nakano

Adopted: Core's decision on NWS
- Core's arg, "Don't do what we do."

(Core's arg is off the division)

while ... dealing on right to

think FC

+ work, FC thinks

+ thinking new standards

("We have a nuclear war")

unpleasant: to get a

message to R or China

But after center has known "Nukes" -

It will not give up more nuclear war out

on our historical road

forget think

just are given

mean our war

a total answer

(note: danger, and

any conflict, and becoming

to operate + diagram

don't read NWS

US/SA to SA in 1991?

to think to ... ?

(Pot think to know?)

don't use anything

we can't think

or NWS, know don't

No can tell US, or NWS,

see 1964, my awareness

Rusk, McN McG

Hilfstrue

— US policy: reward friends, punish enemies

(Israel; Pak; India;
(South Africa?)

Rusk — ^{regime} policy

N/HAK: Nakasone

Not non-proliferation

Hilfstrue: — Can't discriminate among NNWS

— Can't say, "Don't do what we do."

(Can't lead in other direction

while ... declaring our right to
thunder FC

+ making FC threats

+ building new warheads

/"We have a special word/
responsibility: to deter a
resurgent SD or China

But other countries have pressing "needs" —
they will not give up nukes while we act
on our perceived need

No one telling US, or NNWS,

or NNWS, nukes have

no use; not threats

have no credibility

(Pak threat to America?)

Is. threat to ... ?

US/Is to SH in 1991?

forget that
first are guards,

nukes are useless,

a total waste

(rather: dangerous, not

any costly, not barriers

to agreements + disarm.

for each NNWS

NSolomon on Media Hype of August

Why media silence on likelihood of US attack
on Iran? (cf. June 2005?)

R.S. US coverage of Hussein story

NS: to convey justification for attack, need:
but not to convey imminence of attack,
which might cause opposition

[Note: Hussein weapons in hands of Sunnis
suggests it is not a matter of Iran.
Iraqi will, or control, but the black
market?]